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A BATTLE BETWEEN LAW AND SOCIETY
IN MICRONESIA: AN EXAMPLE OF ORIGINALISM
GONE AWRY
Brian Z. Tamanaha†
Abstract: Two conceptions of the relationship between law and society appear to
compete: the idea that law mirrors society and the notion that a gap exists between law
and society. Both ideas have some truth—law is an imperfect mirror of society. For
various reasons, law and society can fall out of sync or even come into conflict. The
1975 Constitutional Convention, which led to the formation of the Federated States of
Micronesia (“FSM”), marked the beginning of a battle between that society and its legal
institutions. The Constitution’s framers strove to preserve traditional Micronesian culture
by ensuring it a respected place alongside modern legal doctrine. Competing influences,
however, conflicted with traditional norms. Despite the reluctance of the framers, the
laws of the United States supplied the language for key provisions of the Constitution,
and U.S. legal precedents strongly influenced judicial interpretations of the Micronesian
Bill of Rights and other constitutional provisions. This put the legal system in tension
with Micronesian norms, and the ensuing battle between law and society continues to this
day. Yet law need not battle society, even when the social and legal systems, with
inconsistent norms and competing systems of power, are poised to clash. Whether or not
they battle depends largely upon the attitudes toward each system taken by the actors
involved.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Two often-repeated notions run through law and society research:
one, that law is a mirror of society, and two, that a gap exists between law
and society. The first notion, in its extreme form, suggests that the
relationship between law and society is so intimate that it is incorrect to
interject the conjunction “and” between these terms—law is always
integrated within and produced by society, and society courses through every
aspect of law, such that they cannot be separated. The second notion, in its
extreme form, suggests that law operates within but is autonomous from
society—a self-defining and self-constituting complex of socially
constructed legal practices, institutions, knowledge, and systems of
communication and language.
Although many law and society scholars accept both propositions as
virtual truisms, an evident tension, if not outright contradiction, exists
†
William Gardiner Hammond Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law. Former
legal counsel for the Micronesian Constitutional Convention of 1990; former Assistant Attorney General
for the State of Yap, Federated States of Micronesia. A version of this article will be published later this
year by Cambridge University Press in The Social and Political Foundations of Constitutions, Mila
Versteeg and Denis Galligan, eds., Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2012.
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between them, for they stake out antipodal positions on the law-society
relationship. Contradiction is avoided by eschewing the extreme form of
each. The middle ground—adopted by most scholars—relies upon a
positivistic understanding to identify law as the law-related activities of legal
professionals and legal officials (picked out from society in this specific
sense), while also acknowledging that law is always infused with and subject
to social influences and factors. Under this common understanding, law is
separable from society, contrary to the extreme mirror position, while law is
also continuously subject to pervasive social influences, contrary to the
extreme autonomy pole.
Even with this moderate view, however, the tension remains. How
can it simultaneously be held that law is a mirror of society and that a gap
exists between law and society? The short answer is that law is an imperfect
mirror of society. Law can be mismatched with, or be out of sync with,
society in various ways for various reasons. Mismatch occurs when law lags
behind rapid social change or when law fails in an effort to produce social
change. Mismatch occurs when law from one society is imposed upon or
transplanted to another society. Mismatch occurs when society is comprised
of different normative groups and the law reflects a selected group but not
others. In these and other situations, when law is manifestly not a reflection
of society, the gaps typically are seen as aberrations or defects, as temporary,
as a failure or flaw, as a deviant legal condition that will or must be
rectified—in the long run at least.
This way of thinking about the well-known “gap problem,” as it is
called in the socio-legal literature, is a product of the notion that law is a
mirror of society: the perception of a gap is dependent on the expectation of
a mirror. That is, it is precisely the background belief that law reflects
society that supplies the implicit assumptions that allow a mismatch or
inconsistency between law and society to be seen as (merely) a “gap.”
In this article, I will explore an instance of law engaging in a pitched
battle with society. This is a fascinating story worth telling in its own right,
which will reveal interesting insights about law and society. Talks of
“mirrors” and “gaps” are metaphors which constrain how we perceive the
interaction between law and society. Sometimes these metaphors are
entirely inapt.
The battle I refer to emerged at the 1975 Micronesian Constitutional
Convention and continues to this day.
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THE BATTLE LINES AT THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION

The convention was held under the auspices of the United States,
through its administration of Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands, a United
Nations mandate created at the close of World War II to help territories
previously under Japanese colonial rule achieve independence. Micronesia
consists of hundreds of small islands across a vast expanse of the tropical
equatorial region in the Western Pacific Ocean, stretching nearly 2,000 miles
from the Philippines toward Hawaii. Beginning in the late-nineteenth
century, much of the region was successively ruled by foreign powers:
Spain, Germany, Japan, and the United States. The convention was
Micronesians’ long awaited exercise of collective self-rule; it was the first
concrete act on the road to political independence.
Delegates from several discrete island groupings within Micronesia
(each with their own languages and cultures)—the Marianas, the Marshalls,
Palau, Yap, Chuuk, Pohnpei, and Kosrae—were brought together in Saipan
to draft a constitution that would then be submitted to the electorate for a
vote. The convention was scheduled for ninety days in session with a break
in the middle to allow delegates to return home for rest and feedback from
constituents. The delegates were supported by a convention administrative
staff: fourteen interpreters to assist those with limited English (the language
of the convention), and a twenty-six-person Research and Drafting Section
which prepared committee reports, drafted constitutional provisions, and
was responsible for much of the written product of the convention.1
The bulk of the discussion at the convention focused on basic political
and institutional design choices: number of national legislators from each
state and the voting system; bicameral or unicameral house; parliamentary or
presidential system; single or plural executive and method of selection;
respective powers of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches
(including allocation of jurisdiction between state and federal courts);
respective powers of state and national governments; taxing power; division
of revenue (mainly U.S. aid money) among the federal government and the
several states; citizenship and suffrage rights; and method of constitutional
amendment. A separate contentious political conflict at the convention
revolved around the insistence of the Palau delegation on a set of nonnegotiable demands, including placement of the national capital in Palau
(Palau and the Marshalls later chose not to join the Federated States of
Micronesia, preferring self-standing independence). Issues surrounding land
1
NORMAN MELLER, CONSTITUTIONALISM IN MICRONESIA (1985). This excellent firsthand account
of the convention supplied the background information in this section.
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ownership were also prominent, including an intense debate (and several
votes) over the government’s power to seize property through eminent
domain; this was a contentious issue because Micronesian cultural systems
are directly tied to the land and because the Trust Territory Administration
had taken land under circumstances the Micronesians considered unfair. 2
Another very important political debate revolved around what role—if
any—traditional leaders would have in the national government. This was a
crucial and delicate debate because traditional leaders were (and remain)
influential in Micronesian societies, and a lack of support from traditional
leaders, it was feared, might lead voters to reject the constitution.
The battle between law and society that I refer to did not involve any
of these political and institutional design issues. Rather, the battle emerged
in connection with two intersecting issues: the impact on custom and
tradition of the proposed bill of rights (and the constitution generally), and
how judges would interpret the constitution and laws.
A.

The Explicit Protection of Custom and Tradition

The desire to preserve custom and tradition was a widely shared
concern which had special salience in connection with civil rights and with
judging. While the delegates supported civil rights, they worried that these
rights might operate to the detriment of custom and tradition. Micronesians
have a hierarchical, communitarian-oriented society, not a Western
individualist society, which several provisions of the Bill of Rights reflect.
To alleviate this concern, an early draft of the Bill of Rights was amended to
specifically include a provision “which will be equal in rank with the other
Bill of Rights to protect and preserve our Micronesian customs, traditional
laws and morality.”3 In support of this provision, a delegate explained that it
would speed the work of the convention “if there [were] a provision in there,
[because] it [would] eliminate unnecessary and lengthy debate concerning
the relationship of custom and traditions to every civil right’s [sic] measure
that would come[] up for consideration on the floor of the Convention.”4
An early draft of this protective measure stated:

2
See, e.g., Chief Bossy, Convention Del., Remarks on Eminent Domain (Aug. 16, 1975), in 1
JOURNAL OF THE MICRONESIAN CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1975, at 136 (1976) (“Many of my
people have had the misfortune of owning beautiful parcels of land which the Trust Territory Government
wanted, and the government took, through the exercise of . . . eminent domain.”).
3
Jacob Sawaichi, Convention Del., Remarks on Special Committee Report No. 2 (Aug. 16, 1975),
in 1 JOURNAL OF THE MICRONESIAN CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1975, at 134-35 (1976).
4
Id. at 135.
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Protection of Micronesian Tradition. The traditions of the
Micronesian people may be protected by legislation and
administrative action taken pursuant thereto. If challenged as
violative of any of the provisions of this [Bill of Rights], the
essentiality of the Micronesian tradition protected may be
considered as a compelling social purpose warranting such
governmental action.5
Notwithstanding the apparent thrust of this proposal to accord protection to
custom, a delegate opposed it on the astute grounds that it appeared to grant
courts the authority to hear challenges against custom, and the language
(“may be considered . . . compelling”) implied the power to rule against
custom:
I feel this amendment clearly indicates, to me, that every time
an alleged violation of our traditions and customs is taken to the
court, the court’s ruling is final and that ruling prevails. This
means to me, further, Mr. President, that should a court in
Micronesia rule against tradition and custom, one by one, our
tradition and custom will undergo a very, very slow death.
These customs and traditions which we are supposedly
attempting to protect will slowly disappear from the face of
Micronesia.6
To eliminate this concern, the final enacted version changed “may” into
“shall,” as follows: “[i]f challenged as violative of [the Bill of Rights],
protection of Micronesian tradition shall be considered a compelling social
purpose warranting such governmental action.”7
B.

The Judicial Guidance Clause

The second front in the battle was a pointed effort to restrict courts to
Micronesian sources of law—to finally end the dominance of U.S. law in
Micronesia after decades under Trust Territory courts employing American
judges who applied U.S. law. As one delegate remarked, “I wish to point out
that in the past the Trust Territory Courts have copied to a great extent
5
Comm. Proposal No. 4, Providing for the Preservation of Local Customs, in 1 JOURNAL OF THE
MICRONESIAN CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1975, at 148-49 (1976).
6
Leo A. Falcam, Convention Del., Remarks on Committee Proposal No. 22 (Oct. 25, 1975), in 1
JOURNAL OF THE MICRONESIAN CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1975, at 149 (1976).
7
FSM CONST. art. V, § 2. In earlier drafts, this provision was included within the Bill of Rights,
but it was later taken out and combined with the provision on the powers of traditional leaders to create a
separate article specifically dealing with traditional rights.
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English common law which I sometimes think is not relevant here in
Micronesia.”8 A delegate proposed two separate provisions to achieve this
effect. The first proposal stated:
The interpretation of this constitution shall not be made in the
light of any other constitution known in Micronesia,
immediately before the effective date of the constitution.9
The intention behind this provision, as attributed to its proponent, was
“that . . . the Micronesian courts [not] interpret the Micronesian Constitution
in the same way as interpreted by the courts of another jurisdiction whose
constitution contained identical or similar language.”10
As will be revealed in the course of this article, this observation is of
crucial significance in the battle between law and society. It evidences clear
awareness on the part of the delegates that the language of constitutional
provisions borrowed from the U.S. Constitution is likely to be interpreted
relying upon U.S. court decisions, and it manifests a strong desire to reject
this practice of interpretation.
A second provision was proposed as well:
Commencing with the effective date of this constitution, all
common law, foreign to Micronesia, shall cease to exist. All
legal interpretations shall henceforth be drawn from this
Constitution.11
The explained intention behind this proposal, in part, was a desire “to build
up a body of Micronesian common law, through court decisions based on
Micronesian customs and traditions and the total social and physical
configuration of Micronesian life.”12
There is no mistaking the sentiment behind these two proposals,
which evince a heartfelt determination to halt the dominance of U.S. law in
Micronesia. The Research and Drafting Section softened these proposals out
of worry that that they would hamstring courts by prohibiting them from
drawing upon anything not stated in the Constitution or statutes. They were
rephrased from mandatory prohibitions to instead allow courts the freedom
to consider other sources of interpretation and other bodies of law, while still
8
Hans Wiliander, Convention Del., Remarks on Special Committee Report No. 2 (Aug. 16, 1975),
in 1 JOURNAL OF THE MICRONESIAN CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1975, at 420 (1976).
9
Misc. Commc’n No. 23, in 1 JOURNAL OF THE MICRONESIAN CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF
1975, at 349, 351 (1976) (Letter from Norman Meller, Dir. of Research & Drafting, to Hon. Tosiwo
Nakayama, Micronesian Const. Convention President (Oct. 13, 1975)).
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id. at 352.
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emphasizing that appropriateness for Micronesian circumstances remained
paramount.
The version that made it to the floor merged the two foregoing
proposals into one:
Judicial Guidance. Decisions of Micronesian Courts shall be
consistent with this Constitution, Micronesian customs and
traditions, and the social and geographical configuration of
Micronesia. Decisions of the Trust Territory Courts, and the
common law of other nations, are not binding precedents.13
However, an amendment was proposed to delete the second sentence
on the grounds that it was problematic and unnecessary. It was potentially
problematic in the view of some delegates because a significant body of law
had been built up in the preceding decades as well as by foreign courts
which could be a useful source of law for Micronesian courts to consider
(albeit not as binding precedent). The main opposition was that the second
sentence was unnecessary. As one delegate put it, “the new courts are not
going to be bound as a practical consequence of having adopted the new
Constitution by the previous decisions of courts. We need not say that. To
say it means that we are overly worried about something we should not be
concerned about.”14 He added that explicitly stating that they are not bound
by the decisions of other courts—given that it is self-evidently true—“only
shows our sense of insecurity.”15 Over a delegate’s objection that the second
sentence serves as a useful reminder, the convention voted to enact only the
first sentence, which became the “Judicial Guidance Clause,” Section 11 of
Article XI on the Judiciary.
C.

The Impenetrability of Technical Legal Language

The third battle line was drawn around the fact that important
constitutional provisions had obscure legal meanings and implications. This
was not a problem with respect to the political and institutional design issues
mentioned earlier, all of which were fully debated and crafted in accordance
with the directions of the delegates. Yet several crucial provisions, including
the entire Bill of Rights, were drafted by the legal staff, borrowing language

13
Committee Proposal No. 22, Proposal Relating To Judicial Guidance, in 1 JOURNAL OF THE
MICRONESIAN CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1975, at 419 (1976).
14
Johnson Toribiong, Convention Del., Remarks on Committee Proposal No. 22 (Oct. 25, 1975), in
1 JOURNAL OF THE MICRONESIAN CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1975, at 420 (1976).
15
Id. at 421.
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from the U.S. Constitution and court decisions. The accompanying
committee reports explained these provisions in a highly technical manner.
This issue came to a head when, on the sixty-fifth day of the
convention, a group of traditional leaders requested a one-week
postponement on consideration of the Bill of Rights to allow them the time
to absorb the dense, legalistic twenty-page committee report that explained
the provisions. The delegate requesting the delay noted a general problem
with legal terminology at the convention:
There are times that we may think and feel that we have
understood important issues—and all of a sudden we find
ourselves wondering why we voted yes or no on a particular
matter. I am very much concerned that the language we are
using in this Convention is a second language to all of us and is
not well understood by most of us, if not at all. These are
highly technical, highly abstract issues written in a language
unfamiliar to most of us so I can sympathize with the efforts of
the traditional chiefs in attempting to make sure that they fully
appreciate and fully understand what they are adopting and
making a part of the Constitution of our new government.16
Two delegates separately objected that the committee report was filled
with citations to U.S. cases and was extremely difficult to comprehend, and,
furthermore, that the oral explanations provided by the legal staff who
drafted the report did not help clear up matters.
In response to these general complaints, the Director of Research and
Drafting, Norman Meller, explained to the convention floor that problems of
this sort are inevitable when legal language is borrowed:
Language which is being used in the Constitution has meaning.
The exact meaning will be determined by Micronesian courts
after the Constitution goes into effect. Meanwhile, to assist the
Delegates to understand both its possible scope and limitations,
reference has been made to the practices of other countries. . . .
With regard to the Declaration of Rights portion of the
Constitution, U.S. cases have been used as examples of
interpretation. This is because the United States was a pioneer
in the inclusion of a Bill of Rights in a national constitution and
it is common for other countries to look to American
16

Leo A. Falcam, Convention Del., Remarks on Proposed Delay (Oct. 10, 1975), in 1 JOURNAL OF
at 311 (1976).

THE MICRONESIAN CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1975,
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experience. I hasten to add that this is not the same thing as
saying the courts in those countries are, or in Micronesia, will
be, bound by those American decisions. . . . If desired, staff
will eliminate all references to judicial decisions in materials
we prepare. Unfortunately, if called upon to answer questions
on the possible legal meaning of phraseology, whether or not a
case is referred to by name, the knowledge of how the courts
have interpreted that language must be availed of by staff in
responding, if their response is to be as accurate as they can
make it.17
To appreciate the magnitude of this problem and to comprehend the
extent to which the delegates were mystified by the legal terminology, it is
necessary to read an excerpt of the committee report that accompanied the
proposed Bill of Rights. While reading the excerpt, keep in mind that
English was a second language for the delegates, most of whom had little or
no legal training. The proposed due process and equal protection clause
read: “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law nor be denied equal protection of the laws.”18 The report
follows this proposed constitutional language with ten explanatory
paragraphs. Here is one of the paragraphs:
While procedural due process requires governmental
decision-making to conform with the concept of what is fair
and just, substantive due process, on the other hand, addresses
the rationality of the legislature. With substantive due process,
the court basically looks at the rationale or legitimacy of the
governmental interest.
In subjecting a statute to the
requirements of substantive due process, the court asks: (1)
Does the government have power to regulate the subject
matter? If the statute is not within the power of the
government, the statute will be struck down. For example,
inasmuch as public monies cannot be expended for other than
public purposes, a fortiori, an exercise of the taxing power for
merely private purposes is beyond the authority of the
legislature. Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 255 (1875);
Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 300 U.S. 644 (1937).
17

Misc. Commc’n No. 23, supra note 9, at 350.
Standing Comm. Rept. [SCREP] No. 23, in 2 JOURNAL OF THE MICRONESIAN CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION OF 1975, at 793, 795 (1976) (Comm. on Civil Liberties, Comm. Proposal No. 14, Bill of
Rights).
18
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(2) If the government has the power to regulate, the court next
asks if what the statute proposes to do bears a rational
relationship to the implementation of the legislative goal.
Another way of asking the same question is, “Can any
reasonable legislature choose this particular statute to achieve
its goal?” In subjecting a statute to this second test, it must be
pointed out that the statute is presumed to be valid. The
challengers of the statute must bear the burden of proving that
the statute is devoid of any rational basis. Additionally, with
respect to economic measures, the courts do not substitute their
social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative
bodies. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877); Ferguson v.
Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730, 733 (1963). (3) Finally, where the
statute involved arguably infringes upon individuals’
fundamental rights, the court must ask how important is the
legislative objective. In other words, where fundamental rights
are involved, the court resorts to balancing the legislative goals
against the fundamental rights which would arguably be
infringed if the statute were to stand. The court must ask if
there is a compelling governmental interest to justify holding
the statute valid, even though the statute might limit
fundamental rights.
The burden of proving compelling
governmental interest shifts to the government.
The
presumption is in favor of protecting fundamental rights, until
the government proves a compelling justification to so curb
these rights. Such presumption also protects against irrational
application of valid statutes.19
One can admire the valiant effort of the legal staff to condense the
complex constitutional doctrine of substantive due process into a single
paragraph, while still recognizing that this passage, which assumes a great
deal of background legal knowledge, would be impenetrable to most nonlawyers who read it (all the worse for non-native English speakers). To
understand this passage one must know about, at minimum, the distinction
between procedure and substance, the rational relation test, the balancing
test, what burdens of proof and presumptions are, what fundamental rights
are, and how to measure a compelling government interest. Now imagine
twenty pages of this sort of text, which comprised the committee report on

19

Id. at 796.
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the Bill of Rights, and the dilemma confronting the delegates becomes
apparent.
That is why the delegates protested. They were fully aware, and
deeply discomfited, that they were giving their imprimatur to constitutional
words that would be interpreted and applied—words that would bind future
law-makers and citizens—in ways they could not fully grasp. The concern
generated by this lack of comprehension was magnified by the fact that the
committee report was filled with reference to U.S. cases, contrary to the
expressed desire of the delegates to be freed of the dictates of U.S. law (as
manifested in the aforementioned Judicial Guidance Clause).20 Nonetheless,
in response to their complaints, the delegates were in effect told by the legal
staff, “that is how law is.” Legal terminology has the capacity to carry and
convey its own meaning that can be impervious to penetration.
What is remarkable is that the future Micronesia Supreme Court did
precisely what the delegates feared and endeavored to prevent—it adopted a
broad swath of U.S. law. In a cruel twist of events, the very delegates who
labored mightily to sever the subservience to U.S. law were later to become
the authority that judges invoked when adopting U.S. law.
To provide a foretaste of the next phase of the battle, which will be
taken up in the following section, it is useful to note here that the paragraph
quoted above was recited in an opinion by Supreme Court Chief Judge
Edward C. King in a case deciding whether a governmental immunity bar to
a medical malpractice suit infringed upon the Due Process Clause. The
details of the case are not relevant here. What matters is how Judge King
utilized the above passage. Immediately after quoting the above passage
from the committee report, he asserted,
This explanation reveals that the framers anticipated that,
depending on the nature of the rights involved, one of two
different kinds of tests would be applied to determine whether a
particular governmental regulation or statute which affects life,
liberty or property is consistent with the constitutional demand
for ‘due process of law.’”21
Proceeding to apply the two tests (in the name of the framers), King
continued in the same vein, asserting that “it appears quite likely that the
framers anticipated that other rights, not specifically referred to in the

20
21

See supra Part II.B.
Samuel v. Prior, 5 FSM Intrm. 91, 101-02 (Pon. 1991) (emphasis added).
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declaration of rights, would be protected as fundamental rights under the
Due Process Clause.”22
The legal staff that authored the report might have anticipated these
things. However, in light of the concerns expressed by the delegates about
the impenetrability of the legal terminology—and their complaints about this
committee report in particular—it seems well warranted to assert that the
delegates anticipated nothing of the sort. In a book recounting the
convention, Norman Meller highlighted this reality:
All Convention actions occurred within a constraining
paradigm of language and law which most delegates could
vaguely sense, but about which I was acutely aware and could
do little. Everything formally said and written was in English,
the official language of the Convention, as was all personal
intercommunication between delegates not hailing from the
same district. Interpreters labored to bridge the gap between
the vernaculars of their principals and the complex English
within which ideas frequently took shape, try as staff might to
simplify the language employed. But there was a problem
beyond interpretation or minimizing the use of “legalism,” for
all of the English terminology employed was technical in the
sense that it depended upon a warp and woof of historical
concept and legal experience with which few of the delegates
were adequately conversant, regardless of their Englishspeaking abilities.
To give specificity to the words employed, and being
trained in American law, the staff referred to American practice
and judicial construction of meanings. As a matter of course,
they shaped delegate and committee proposals, as well as the
supporting rationale contained in committee reports, within the
general conceptual frame of a common law jurisprudence.23
When discussing this problem, Meller—the head of Research and
Drafting—writes as if the legal staff had no real option: “What other course
could the staff have followed in an area which for over three decades had
been and was yet being administered under the usages of the English
language as embodied in American legal practice?”24

22
23
24

Id. at 102 (emphasis added).
MELLER, supra note 1, at 196.
Id.
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The legal staff was indeed grappling with a difficult task. Yet other
options were available at hand, as Meller acknowledges, in existing
constitutional models from other Pacific Island countries like Fiji and
Western Samoa.25 Choices were made by the legal staff, choices shaped by
assumptions taken from their American legal training.
Moreover, while the legal staff assumed the posture of merely
formalizing into legal language the desires of the delegates, they did much
more than that. In some instances they were active agents who shaped the
substantive thrust of the constitutional provisions. This is evident in
Section 4 of the Bill of Rights: “Equal Protection of the laws may not be
denied or impaired on account of sex, race, ancestry, national origin,
language, or social status.” 26 This is far more expansive than the Equal
Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Meller justified the additional
categories as reflective of “the additional meanings accreted elsewhere over
time through court interpretation.”27 Setting aside the question of whether
this was indeed an accurate restatement of U.S. equal protection law (rather
than the legal staff’s ideal version of equal protection law), the crucial point
is that this new language inserted by the legal staff carried within it
potentially fundamental implications for Micronesian culture and society.
To state just the two most obvious areas, Micronesian cultures have radically
different gender roles and relations from those in the United States, and they
are hierarchical societies (for example, Yap has a caste system). The explicit
inclusion of “sex” and “social status” potentially threatens these deep
cultural values in uncertain and unknowable ways. This is why, as Meller
recognized, one of the most contentious issues was “basic conflict on the
floor touching the quick of Convention emotions regarding the primacy of
traditional rights over the civil liberties more recently introduced into
Micronesia.”28
Thus, the battle between law and society was joined. The delegates
appeared to prevail on behalf of society in this crucial engagement by
including a provision that would explicitly protect custom and tradition
when a clash arose with the Bill of Rights, and by including the Judicial
Guidance Clause to require judges to develop a Micronesian body of law.
Yet none of this would ensure that their wishes would be heeded, as the
delegates seemed to sense, owing to the immanent potential of legal
terminology to exert its own meanings.
25
26
27
28

Id. at 197.
Id.
Id. at 245.
Id. at 198.
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The Constitution was ratified three years after the convention, in 1978
(the intervening delay was caused by U.S. objections to certain provisions in
the draft), and the new nation was called the Federated States of Micronesia
(“FSM”). Edward C. King and Richard Benson were appointed in 1980 as
the first two judges on the national court—called the FSM Supreme Court—
by the first President, Tosiwo Nakayama. The Court began to function in
May 1981. It was divided into trial and appellate levels; as there were only
two judges at the time, the judge who did not hear the case at trial would
preside on appeals, along with two temporarily appointed judges sitting by
designation to hear the case. Benson and King were American expatriate
lawyers, both of whom had spent time in the region prior to their
appointment, Benson as a judge on nearby Guam for several years, King as
an attorney for four years in the Micronesian Legal Services Corporation
based in Saipan. The judges whom King and Benson invited to sit by
designation on appellate panels ranged from local state judges to American
federal court judges. Given this arrangement, it was inevitable that the
approaches taken by Judges King and Benson would substantially shape the
jurisprudence of the new nation.
Judge King, in particular, embraced his mission to build a body of law
for the country. The focus herein will be limited to his decisions as they
relate to the battle between law and society traced out in this article—his
work at the intersection of custom and tradition, the Bill of Rights,
subservience to U.S. case law, and the Judicial Guidance Clause.
A notable aspect of Judge King’s analysis was his frequent and heavy
reliance on “the framers” when justifying his decisions. In his eleven years
on the court, from 1981 to 1992, King referred to “framers” in thirty-six
separate opinions. This exceeds the combined total references to “the
framers” (twenty-seven in all) in opinions written by all the other judges on
the court from 1981 through 2007 (five judges have secured permanent
appointments to the Supreme Court since its inception). There is nothing
untoward in referring to the framers. One of the main tasks of the new court
was to work out the implications of the new Constitution, and one way for
judges to work this out was to consider the purposes of the people who
prepared it. However, two oddities stand out regarding Judge King’s
analysis: his references to “the framers” hardly resemble the delegates who
were actually at the convention, and time and again his invocation of the
framers served as a prelude to (and justification for) the adoption of
American law.
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One of King’s very first decisions, when sitting as a trial judge in a
criminal prosecution, considered the issue of whether evidence seized by
police without a search warrant can be used in the criminal case against a
defendant. The relevant constitutional provision reads: “The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and other possessions
against unreasonable search, seizure, or invasion of privacy may not be
violated.”29 As King noted, this clause, which is modeled on the Fourth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, does not specify how to determine
what makes a search “unreasonable,” nor what should happen to evidence
obtained in constitutionally inappropriate searches. “We must probe
further,” King continued, “to determine the full meaning of the framers in
employing this constitutional language.”30 King then pointed to the Journal
of the Constitutional Convention:
The Journal in this instance . . . provides unmistakable
direction.
The Micronesian Constitutional Convention’s
Committee on Civil Rights proposed the Declaration of Rights
in substantially the form subsequently incorporated within the
constitution. . . . The proposed language and supplemental
discussions in the Committee Report reveal that in developing
the Declaration of Rights for the Constitution of the Federated
States of Micronesia, the Committee, and subsequently the
Convention itself, were drawing almost exclusively upon
constitutional principles under United States law.31
This would prove to be a fateful analytical move. For the next step—which
came after Judge King noted the substantial similarity between the wording
of the U.S. Search and Seizure Clause and the FSM Search and Seizure
Clause—followed almost inexorably from the first:
Thus, the Journal of the Micronesian Constitutional
Convention teaches that, in interpreting the Declaration of
Rights in the Constitution of the Federated States of
Micronesia, we should emphasize and carefully consider United
States Supreme Court interpretations of comparable language
in the Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution. We
therefore turn to these decisions for aid in determining the
meaning of the word “unreasonable” and in framing principles
to be employed in upholding the protection against
29
30
31

FSM CONST. art. IV, § 5.
FSM v. Tipen, 1 FSM Intrm. 79, 83 (Pon. 82) (emphasis added).
Id. at 83 (internal citation omitted) (citing Standing Comm. Rept. No. 23, supra note 18).
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unreasonable search proclaimed in Article IV, Section 5 of the
Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia.32
Judge King then launched into an exegesis of U.S. constitutional search and
seizure doctrine, extensively quoting from or citing sixteen U.S. Supreme
Court cases. He ended up adopting the U.S. reasonableness analysis for the
FSM.
In the bootstrapping style characteristic of common law legal analysis,
this case, FSM v. Tipen, would later be cited (frequently by King himself) for
the propositions that the similar language in the U.S. and Micronesian Bills
of Rights suggest that U.S. case law should be considered. King did not
mention the Judicial Guidance Clause in his decision, the objections from
delegates at the convention about the heavy reliance on U.S. case law in the
committee report, or their complaints that they could not apprehend the legal
explanations in the report.
This was the beginning of a pattern Judge King would reiterate
multiple times. An early appellate opinion issued the same year, Alaphonso
v. FSM, which considered what burden of proof is required in criminal cases,
introduced a twist on this pattern involving the Judicial Guidance Clause. At
the outset of the opinion, King chastised the lawyers for their omission:
The parties here have . . . merely cited legal authorities from the
United States, including decisions of United States federal and
state courts, without explaining why those authorities are
pertinent to these issues before this Court.
The Constitution instructs us that we may not merely
assume away, or ignore, fundamental issues on the grounds that
these basic issues have previously been decided in a particular
way by other courts in other circumstances and under different
governmental systems. The “judicial guidance” provision, Art.
XI, § 11 of the Constitution, tells us that our decisions must be
“consistent” with the “Constitution, Micronesian customs and
traditions, and the social and geographical configuration of
Micronesia.”33
King quoted two passages from the report attached to the Judicial
Guidance Clause explaining the desire of the delegates to shape a body of
law suitable to Micronesia, rather than blindly follow Trust Territory cases
and U.S. law. In later cases, Judge King would often cite Alaphonso for the
32
33

Id. at 85 (emphasis added).
Alaphonso v. FSM, 1 FSM Intrm. 209, 212 (Pon. 1982).
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proposition that the Court paid due regard for the unique circumstances of
Micronesia.
In the case itself, however, after his extended homage to the Judicial
Guidance Clause, Judge King immediately veered in a different direction.
He noted that the Due Process Clause in the FSM Constitution says nothing
about the burden of proof in criminal cases; he noted the parallel language
between the Due Process Clauses in the U.S. and FSM constitutions; and he
noted that in the committee report attached to the Due Process Clause “the
Committee relied principally upon decisions of the United States Supreme
Court . . . . The obvious lesson is that we are to look to the interpretative
decisions of United States courts concerning the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.”34 Thus, following his
nod to the Judicial Guidance Clause, King arrived on familiar ground, citing
ten U.S. cases, adopting the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard for the
FSM.
In the course of his analysis, Judge King made a seemingly odd
remark that he treated as highly significant:
The framers of this Constitution, and subsequently the voters in
ratifying could only have been aware of constitutional
interpretations rendered prior to and at the times of the
Constitutional Convention, and ratification of the Constitution
through plebiscite.
We should therefore emphasize
interpretations in effect at those times.35
Judge King touted, and often later repeated, this cut-off date as an essential
“protection” for Micronesians—“a timing limitation, which diminishes the
import of decisions made by the U.S. Supreme Court after July 12, 1978, the
date of the plebiscite.”36
This remark is odd for several reasons. King’s careful locution—they
“could only have been aware” of a U.S. precedent in existence at the time
they voted—is logically unassailable (of course they could not possibly
know of anything that did not exist then). However, the soundness of his
assertion that pre-1978 precedents carry greater import depends upon the
correctness of one or both of the following positive assertions: that the
delegates and voters were in fact aware of or that they did in fact intend that

34

Id. at 215-16.
Id. at 215 (emphasis added).
36
Edward C. King, Custom and Constitutionalism in the Federated States of Micronesia, 3 ASIANPAC. L. & POL’Y J. 249, 266 (2002).
35
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greater weight be given to U.S. precedents then in existence. Neither
assertion is remotely true.
It is a pure pretense to suggest that the delegates had any awareness of
U.S. constitutional decisions at the time. As described earlier, the delegates
struggled to understand the legal explanations prepared by the legal staff for
the Bill of Rights.37 None of the U.S. cases Judge King cited in Alaphonso
(and in many other decisions King later wrote following this analysis) were
actually mentioned in the committee report. Judge King’s cut-off date is the
mid-1978 ratification by voters, which is a abuse of fact and reason. It
borders on deception to imply that the voters had any knowledge of or
intention about pre-vote cases. The delegates at least had an opportunity to
review the committee report (never mind understand it). However, the
people, the mass of Micronesians in villages and towns (many with limited
English and education) who voted to ratify the Constitution had no exposure
to it and had no idea what it contained. Leading up to the vote, there were
public meetings and general education programs about the proposed
constitution, but there was no detailed legal analysis, which the people may
not have been able to understand anyway.
As for their actual intent, the delegates had repeated their fervent wish
to halt the practice of blind obedience to U.S. precedent, although they
permitted consideration of U.S. decisions for whatever insight they might
offer to Micronesian judges. 38 Remember, on this point, that several
delegates explicitly complained about the presence of citations to U.S.
Supreme Court cases in the committee report attached to the Bill of Rights,
which prompted the Director of Research and Drafting to offer to excise the
U.S. cases (although he said it would be pointless). The delegates, with their
unmistakable intention, would have attached no significance to when the
U.S. precedent was decided, whether before or after the convention, because
under all circumstances, U.S. precedents were not to be binding—that is
exactly what the delegates had said. All U.S. precedents would have the
same weight: they were information for the Micronesian judge to consider.
The crucial distinction Judge King drew between pre- and postratification U.S. cases was meaningless with respect to what the delegates
and voters actually knew, and it was contrary to what they actually intended.
It was an elaborate gesture of self-abnegation on the part of Judge King (and
other judges who have repeated it) to maintain the veneer that his decisions
comported with the consent of the people as embodied in their drafting and
adoption of the Constitution. (This was a “gesture” rather than a genuine
37
38

See supra Part II.C.
See supra Part II.B.
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limitation because, notwithstanding his assertion, Judge King regularly cited
post-1978 U.S. cases anyway.) 39 He would point to the “protection”
provided by the cut-off date as a significant mark of the genuine
independence of the Micronesian court from obedience to U.S. law.
Alaphonso became a template for future cases. Judge King would
begin with a nod to the Judicial Guidance Clause; then he would note the
similarity in language between the U.S. and FSM constitutional language
and mention that the committee reports cited U.S. cases; next, he would
engage in extensive discussions of U.S. case law; finally, he would conclude
by adopting U.S. legal approaches. Following this mode of analysis, he
adopted U.S. doctrines of judicial review,40 search and seizure,41 vagueness
in criminal statutes, 42 abstention, 43 voluntariness in confessions, 44 and
common law claims,45 among other legal doctrines. 46 On occasion, King
rejected prevailing U.S. law, but rarely on the grounds that it was unsuitable
for Micronesian circumstances—he simply appeared to disagree.47 In this
manner, he steadily built up a body of law that closely resembled U.S.
common law and individual liberties analysis.
At times, Judge King’s analysis of the framers was perfunctory and
conclusive. In a case in which the defendant argued that the police could not
search an open field without a warrant, Judge King noted that since Hester v.
United States, decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1924, the law was clear
that warrantless open field searches do not violate the Fourth Amendment.
The framers of the Federated States of Micronesia Constitution
looked to United States court decisions to determine the
meaning to the words they were selecting for the declaration of
rights in this Constitution.
39

See, e.g., United Church of Christ v. Hanno, 4 FSM Intrm. 95 (App. 1989); FSM v. Jonathan, 2
FSM Intrm. 189 (Kos. 1986).
40
Suldan v. FSM, 1 FSM Intrm. 339 (Pon. 1983).
41
FSM v. George, 1 FSM Intrm. 449 (Kos. 1984).
42
Laion v. FSM, 1 FSM Intrm. 503 (App. 1984).
43
Panuelo v. Pohnpei, 2 FSM Intrm. 150 (Pon. 1986).
44
FSM v. Jonathan, 2 FSM Intrm. 189 (Kos. 1986).
45
Semes v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., 2 FSM Intrm. 131 (Pon. 1985).
46
An excellent survey of the Court’s jurisprudence is provided in Dennis K. Yamase, THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA: THE FIRST TWENTY FIVE YEARS (2006), available at
http://www.fsmlaw.org/fsm/rules/FSMSupCt25YrsforPDF.pdf.
47
See Federal Business Development Bank v. SS Thorfinn, 4 FSM Intrm. 367 (App. 1990)
(declining to follow U.S. precedent that foreclosure on ship is not within maritime jurisdiction); Aisek v.
Foreign Investment Board, 2 FSM Intrm. 95 (Pon. 1985) (adopting the concrete adversary requirement of
standing doctrine, but rejecting the nexus requirement); see Samuel v. Prior, 5 FSM Intrm. 91 (Pon. 1991)
(refusing to recognize medical malpractice claim, although other common law claims previously
recognized).
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The searches here fall within the Hester open fields
doctrine. There is no reason to doubt that the framers intended
for that doctrine to apply here.48
Contrary to King’s assertion, it is unequivocally clear that the
delegates had no intention at all about the matter. Needless to say, the
Hester decision and the open fields doctrine were never mentioned at the
convention—and the committee report (which King cites) on this particular
provision of the Bill of Rights does not actually refer to any U.S. cases.49
Most of the time, Judge King invoked the framers to draw a positive
warrant for the incorporation of U.S. case law, but in a few instances he
found no evidence of framers’ intent, which allowed him to avoid following
U.S. precedents. In a case involving whether the enforcement of a mortgage
on a ship is within the Court’s admiralty jurisdiction, King was confronted
with a 150-year-old U.S. Supreme Court precedent that mortgages fall
outside admiralty jurisdiction. Judge King cited several criticisms by U.S.
legal scholars of this early decision, he emphasized the import of the Judicial
Guidance Clause, and then he raised the framers:
Of course, if the constitutional history of the Federated
States of Micronesia revealed that the framers, or the
electorate, in embracing the language of the United States
Constitution, specifically intended to adopt the particular
interpretation given those words by the United States courts,
then we would not be free to seek an alternative meaning.
However, the journals of the Micronesian Constitutional
Convention reveal no such specific intent concerning the
meaning of the words “admiralty or maritime.”50
In light of his general approach, this is an astonishing passage. In
none of the cases discussed above in which King relied upon framers’ intent
to adopt U.S. case analysis was there any evidence of specific intention to
support his reliance. In all of those cases—for example, whether the Due
Process Clause requires the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard—the
Constitution and Journal of the Constitutional Convention were silent,
suggesting that no one had thought about the issue. Indeed, the strongest
evidence of intention that bears on the issue was the general desire of the
48
FSM v. Rosario, 3 FSM Intrm. 387, 388-89 (Pon. 1988) (emphasis added) (citation omitted)
(citing Standing Comm. Rept. No. 23, supra note 18, at 793).
49
See Standing Comm. Rept. No. 23, supra note 18.
50
Federal Business Development Bank v. SS Thorfinn, 4 FSM Intrm. 367, 372 (App. 1990)
(emphasis added).
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delegates that the future court not slavishly follow U.S. precedent, a desire
which Judge King largely frustrated.
Another telling case raised the issue of the standing requirements
plaintiffs must meet to bring suit. Issues about standing to sue are not
addressed in the Constitution and were not raised at the convention. Per
usual, Judge King began with a reference to the import of the Judicial
Guidance Clause, then made this strongly stated assertion: “Many
provisions of this Constitution are derived from the United States
Constitution and the framers surely intended that interpretation of the words
adopted would be influenced by United States decisions in existence when
this Constitution was adopted, in October 1975, and ratified on July 12,
1978.”51 To the contrary, as argued above, they surely had no such intention.
What makes this case revealing is that Judge King wanted to loosen the yoke
of U.S. standing law—to adopt the “concrete adverseness” requirement of
standing doctrine but not the “nexus” requirement. To provide himself this
freedom, King noted that standing law happened to be “a particularly
unsettled area of United States law when the FSM Constitution was drafted
and ratified.”52 Because it was unsettled, his reasoning went, the framers
and voters would not have been certain about the law (in fact they knew
nothing about it either way). King then remarked that in 1978, the nexus
requirement was limited to taxpayer suits. “Thus ratification of the
Constitution can not be seen as indicating an intention by the framers or the
people of the Federated States of Micronesia that this additional obstacle to
court access be adopted.”53
Judge King was indisputably correct that the framers and people had
no intention to adopt the nexus requirement, but they just as surely had no
intention to adopt any of the many doctrines taken from U.S. cases that
Judge King positively declared in their name and by their authority. His
analysis of the framers erects an elaborate set of fictions, for the delegates
and voters had no knowledge about any of this, and gave nary a thought to it.
The flesh and blood delegates at the convention were transformed in King’s
legal analysis into abstract entities who must have intended certain things—
no matter how remote from their actual intentions—by virtue of the
language they adopted and the committee reports they (purportedly) read
and understood.
A process of abstraction is often utilized in law to re-describe social
situations and events to conform to and serve legal categories and modes of
51
52
53

Aisek v. Foreign Investment Board, 2 FSM Intrm. 95, 98 (Pon. 1985).
Id. at 99.
Id. at 102.
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analysis. This is one of the ways law manages, constrains, and channels
social influences, sometimes to tame them or stave them off. This is not law
acting on its own—Judge King skillfully wielded these modes of legal
analysis to implant into Micronesian law legal doctrines he was familiar with
and believed in. When so doing, every time Judge King referred to “the
framers,” he erased the actual identity of the Micronesian delegates and
voters and used them to accomplish his own legal ends.
Micronesian law did not have to be built this way, and Judge King did
not have to proceed in this fashion. While it makes sense that he would
adopt legal tests he was familiar with, and it is entirely appropriate that he
would look to U.S. cases for guidance when faced with novel issues, he
could have systematically consulted a range of legal sources, especially the
constitutions and laws of other Pacific Island countries. He could have taken
up each issue on its own terms, evaluating the pros and cons, the relevant
policies and principles, as they bear on the government, the law, and the
political, economic, geographical, and cultural conditions of Micronesia—
indeed, Judge King decided a number of cases in this more open and
straightforward fashion.54 However, to a significant extent, especially early
in his tenure, he relied heavily on U.S. cases and engaged in standard
American-style legal reasoning. His utilization of framers’ intent was
disingenuous, thereby building into the jurisprudence of the new nation a
strain of fictional legal analysis that survived his departure.
When Judge King retired in 1993, he was replaced as Chief Justice by
Andon Amaraich. Amaraich had enjoyed a long career in a variety of high
level government positions in Micronesia. Although he did not have a law
degree, he had worked as a public defender for ten years. He was also a
long-time Congressman under the Trust Territory and the FSM, and he
headed the national department of external affairs under two presidents.55
Directly relevant to this analysis, Amaraich served on the legal staff at the
1975 constitutional convention, drafting a number of the constitutional
provisions.
From 1992 until the end of 2007, Judge Amaraich issued seven
written opinions that referred to “the framers,” far fewer times than Judge
King did. His treatment of the framers stands in stark contrast to that of
Judge King’s. One striking difference is that Amaraich cited far fewer U.S.
cases than King. In four of the seven cases mentioning the framers,
54

See, e.g., Semes v. Continental Air Lines Inc., 2 FSM Intrm. 200 (Pon. 1986).
See Press Release, Government of the Federated States of Micronesia, The Federated States of
Micronesia Mourns the Loss of one of its Founding Fathers: Chief Justice Andon Amaraich (Jan. 28, 2010),
available at http://www.fsmgov.org/press/pr012810.htm.
55
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Amaraich cited zero U.S. cases; in a fifth and sixth case he cited one and
three U.S. Supreme Court cases, respectively, 56 as informative on the
issues—but without suggesting that the framers intended to endorse those
precedents. In only one case in which he mentioned the framers did Judge
Amaraich engage in a significant discussion of U.S. cases; this was a case
involving the taxing power. Judge Amaraich considered U.S. tax doctrines
(in a separate section labeled “United States Case Law”) on their merits for
how they might inform his decision, choosing to adopt certain tests for his
analysis, but at no point did he link these cases back to the framers’ intent.57
Another striking difference is that when Amaraich discussed the framers’
intent, it was in relation to things the framers actually did debate and try to
achieve, whereas Judge King’s references to the framers tended to be purely
abstract discussions of what they must have intended when borrowing U.S.
constitutional language. Judge Amaraich also frankly acknowledged that
legal questions arose which the framers simply had not foreseen, and he
accepted responsibility for making the decision. 58 No abstract framers
appear in the pages of Judge Amaraich’s opinions.
IV.

THE EXISTENTIAL BATTLE BETWEEN SOCIETY AND LAW

While the struggle revolving around “the framers” was concealed in
the dry legal analysis of judicial opinions, a remarkable clash between law
and society erupted in plain view that exposed the depth of the conflict. In
separate incidents on Yap several months apart in 1988, Joseph Tammed and
Raphael Tamangrow each committed sexual assault.59 Ten days after his
attack, Tammed was taken by relatives of the victim to the victim’s father’s
house and severely beaten, left with a bloodied face and a broken hand.
Tamangrow was likewise seized, a week after his attack, by fellow villagers
of the victim, and severely beaten to the point of unconsciousness; he was
thereafter hospitalized for five days (adding to his offense was the fact that
his victim was of a higher caste). According to members of the community,
both beatings were administered as customary punishment.
Tammed and Tamangrow were later separately charged and convicted
of sexual assault. At their respective sentencing hearings, they asked the
presiding judge, Richard Benson, to reduce their sentences in light of the
56
See Pohnpei v. KSVI, 10 FSM Intrm. 53 (Pon. 2001); Pohnpei v. MV Hai Hsiang, 6 FSM Intrm.
594 (Pon. 1994).
57
See Chuuk v. Secretary of Finance, 8 FSM Intrm. 353 (Pon. 1998).
58
See, e.g., FSM v. Kotobuki Maru No 23, 6 FSM Intrm. 65, 74 (Pon. 1993).
59
The facts of these incidents are set forth in the consolidated case of Tammed v. FSM, 4 FSM
Intrm. 266 (App. 1990).
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“customary beatings” they had suffered. Judge Benson refused to consider
the beatings, stating:
The judgments of this court do have an effect on the community
and in future cases a group of men taking the law into their own
hands can say, “It’s all right. The Court lets us handle the
punishment.” I make that statement not denying that there is
apparently, because it’s been raised in two cases now, a Yapese
custom along these lines.60
Both defendants then appealed their respective sentences, arguing that Judge
Benson erroneously failed to take their customary punishments into
consideration to reduce their sentences.
On Yap, custom and tradition have great importance in social and
political life. The Attorney General (“AG”) of Yap State, Cyprian Manmaw
(now Chief Justice of the Yap State Court, who earned a law degree in the
United States and served as AG for twenty years), followed a policy of
deference to customary actions. The Yap Attorney General’s office
supported Tammed and Tamangrow on their appeal; Manmaw would not
have brought the original assault charges against Tammed and Tamangrow
had the crime been under state jurisdiction because he considered the
customary punishment to resolve the matters.
Judge King ruled in favor of the defendants on appeal, finding that
Judge Benson should have considered the customary punishments in
mitigation of their sentence (citing a similar case from Australia). Yet Judge
King spent the better part of the opinion sending a warning to Yap State that
it would be held to account if it continued to defer to customary
punishments. Here is the critical (threatening) passage:
There is an even greater need for caution in this case
because of the apparent policies of Yap state officials
concerning these kinds of customary punishments, as reflected
in the record and explained further in oral argument. . . .
For example, government counsel during Mr. Tammed’s
sentencing hearing indicated to the trial court that if the office
of the Yap attorney general makes a determination that a
particular punishment has been carried out “in accordance with
Yapese custom,” then that office “would not file the charges” if
the underlying criminal offense was a violation of state rather
than national law.
60

Id. at 271.
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This practice of course amounts to a substitution of the
customary punishment in place of the judicial proceedings and
punishment contemplated by the Constitution and state statutes.
Under the policy of the Yap attorney general’s office, beating is
no longer just a customary punishment, but also serves as the
entire official state trial and punishment for that specific
offense.
The traditional leaders who authorized the
punishment, and the village members who carried it out, may
well be transformed through this ratification into government
agents or officials. . . .
By embracing the customary punishment as fulfillment of
their own prosecutorial and governmental responsibilities,
governmental officials may effectively make themselves
participants in the punishments meted out pursuant to custom.
This policy of the office of the Yap attorney general runs the
risk of so identifying the Yap state government with attacks
upon individuals, which state officials could not carry out
directly, as to transform those customary punishments into
action of the state.61
Through the legal-speak, Judge King was saying that if this policy
was continued, Yap State could be subject to civil lawsuits for customary
punishments, and those who administer the punishment could be subject to
suit as well for civil rights violations (in addition to simple battery). To
make this message clear, King cited the statutory provision for civil rights
claims.62
Judge Benson and Judge King held the unshakable conviction that the
state has a monopoly over law—and, in particular, a monopoly over the
infliction of legitimate violence. This is what Judge Benson was thinking
when he feared that men would “take the law into their own hands.”63 This
explains why Judge King could assert that the customary punishments might
be “the entire official state trial and punishments” and those who carried out
the punishments might be “government agents or officials.” 64 If one
assumes that there is only one legitimate legal system, and that this system
resides in the state, then it follows that any valid punishments are, by
conceptual necessity, actions of the state no matter who carries them out.
61

Id. at 282-83 (emphasis added).
Id. at 284 n.11. In a later article discussing the case, King acknowledged the point of this
reminder. See King, supra note 36, at 278.
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Tammed v. FSM, 4 FSM Intrm. 266, 271 (App. 1990).
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Id. at 282.
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The Yapese people saw the law differently. They saw two legal
systems existing side-by-side, with the state legal system mainly handling
affairs of government and business. With respect to social affairs (including
property rights, family affairs, and altercations), they believed that
customary ways of responding to problems had primacy. That is why
Manmaw deferred to customary actions that effectively resolved matters.
Owing to this primacy, if it happened that police officers were among the
relatives of the victims and hence participated in the customary beatings (as
apparently occurred in Tammed’s punishment), they were acting as members
of the community in their customary capacity—people who just happened to
be police officers—not as police officers.
This is an existential battle in the genuine sense that the judges found
it unacceptable, a threat to the very idea of law, to be confronted with a
competing legal system that people accorded primacy to over state law in
certain affairs. Judge King was not troubled by allowing the customary
punishments to be considered in criminal sentencing because this meant they
operated by leave of and within the parameters established by state law.
Judge King’s overarching assumption that state law must have primacy was
displayed, albeit implicitly, in an article he wrote ten years later, after his
retirement from the bench:
If traditional leaders do believe that continuation of
customary punishments is desirable, traditional leaders and
governmental officials should explore why this is so. Is it
because of a lack of confidence in the constitutional legal
justice system? Is this in turn based on a perception that
communities are unsafe? If so, those concerns should be
discussed, and consideration should be given to the possibility
of adjusting legislative authorizations, law enforcement actions,
and court pretrial detention and sentencing practices to respond
to these concerns.
On the other hand, is it possible that traditional
punishments are being used primarily as a way for the local
community or traditional leadership to assert greater control and
to demand greater respect? Institutions typically seek selfstrengthening devices, and there is no reason why this should be
different for traditional leadership. If this is an important
purpose of customary punishments, could that same benefit be
obtained in some way that does not include physical violence or
possible violation of constitutional standards? Could traditional
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leaders be involved more closely in the criminal justice
process? If traditional leaders believe they are sufficiently
certain as to the identity of an offender to justify a customary
punishment, would they be willing simply to turn over their
information to government officials if they knew that prompt
action would be taken?65
His reflections on Tammed reveal that Judge King never really
understood what was at stake. He could not envision the beatings as
anything other than brutal acts of violence. Of course the traditional leaders
were interested in maintaining their power within the customary system
(much like judges within the state system), as King skeptically suggests, but
events cannot be explained in those terms.
Nor was the issue for the Yapese about improving the state legal
system to better serve their needs as a community, as King’s questions
assume. Rather, at issue was nothing less than the continued existence of
their own thriving legal system, a system they identified with because it was
the product of community actions in accordance with norms they all
understood. Recall, if you will, the complaints of the delegates at the
constitutional convention about the foreign (U.S.) feel and impenetrability of
state law. Their customary system raised no similar objections for the
Yapese people precisely because it was their system.
It is essential to recognize that Yapese society was (and remains)
cohesive and well ordered in large part because its customary systems
functioned fairly well. Manmaw’s policy of deference to the customary
system, which Judge King objected to, served to enhance the functioning of
both legal systems in their own primary spheres, and helped negotiate their
interaction when they intersected.
A final incident will help demonstrate this point.66 When Manmaw
resigned as Attorney General to become Chief Justice, his long-time
assistant in the office, Victor Nabeyan, was appointed to replace him. A few
months after he took the AG position, Nabeyan, while drunk one day,
committed an assault and battery. This was especially embarrassing because
the AG is the top legal official in the state. Nabeyan was immediately
placed on administrative leave by the Governor. The Governor advised the
Speaker of the Legislature that the incident involved family members,
different villages, and possible criminal charges, writing:
65

King, supra note 36, at 280-81.
This incident and subsequent events is described in B. Gorong, Victor Nabeyan Remains as
Attorney General, YAP NETWORKER, July 20, 2007, at 4-5.
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As the resolution of these concerns are a mixture of traditional
and governmental responsibilities and functions—some more
traditional than others, and vice-versa—the Lt. Governor and I,
despite our strong desire to resolve the matter quickly, saw it fit
to let those concerns we have limited authority over, and those
beyond our authority (i.e., family feud, village disputes, and
criminal investigation) be resolved first while waiting for input
from other branches of the state government.67
Nabeyan made a public apology for his conduct, sending the
statement to the Traditional Councils of Pilung and Tamol (the main island
chiefs, and the outer island chiefs, respectively), as well as to all state
officials, and he tendered his resignation to the Governor. Meanwhile,
traditional means of reconciliation took place between the individuals and
families to heal the rift. The Council of Pilung then called for a special
meeting with the Governor and Legislature to express its view that Nabeyan
be allowed to remain as Attorney General to manage the state’s legal
business. “The Council’s belief was that the matter was a ‘non-issue’ for the
State because a ‘weinig’ at the family and village levels had been tendered
and accepted and ‘harmony between and among villages concerned has been
restored.’” 68 The prosecutor’s office (in Nabeyan’s absence) decided to
defer prosecution for battery because the victim refused to press charges
owing to the reconciliation. The Council of Tamol sent a letter telling the
Governor they supported his decision to reinstate Nabeyan “as long as there
should be no conflict between our traditional custom and the State
Government.”69 With these various positions arrived at, the Governor lifted
the three-week leave of absence, and Nebayan served as AG thereafter.
The handling of this incident is a brilliant example of the effective
interweaving, within Yapese society, of traditional customs and processes
with modern governmental processes, including state law, each with its own
realm and ways, yet working in interaction to find workable resolutions.
Judge King could not see the genuine importance of the customary system
and how it worked. King was happy to allow the state legal system to
recognize customary apologies, but not customary punishment70—yet they
were all of a piece, a total way of life, that could not be pried apart while
maintaining its integrity.
67
68
69
70

Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.
See King, supra note 36, at 268-69.
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This final incident also reveals that, against the theme of this article,
law need not battle society, even when the social and legal systems are
poised to clash with inconsistent norms and competing systems of power.
Whether or not they battle depends to a large extent upon the attitudes
toward each system taken by the actors involved—especially the attitudes of
state legal officials.
V.

THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN SOCIETY AND LAW GOING FORWARD

In 1990, after a decade of independence, a second constitutional
convention was held, this time without the United States lurking in the
background. Only three amendments were ultimately enacted, two of which
were directed at the topics discussed above.
One amendment added a new second sentence to the Judicial
Guidance Clause, which now reads (the amendment indicated in italics):
Court decisions shall be consistent with this Constitution,
Micronesian customs and traditions, and the social and
geographical configuration of Micronesia. In rendering a
decision, a court shall consult and apply sources of the
Federated States of Micronesia.71
This addition was an implicit rebuke of the Court’s jurisprudence, and of
Judge King in particular. The committee report proposing the amendment
reads:
A review of Supreme Court decisions since the advent of
constitutional government in the Federated States of Micronesia
shows a pattern of reliance on precedent from the United States.
Your Committee is concerned that the Supreme Court may not
be giving proper attention to section 11 of article XI of the
Constitution.
Therefore, we support re-emphasizing our
determination that courts shall first examine sources from the
Federated States of Micronesia prior to relying upon precedent
from other jurisdictions. The word “source” is used broadly to
include not only court decisions, constitutional history, and
other legal writings from the Federated States of Micronesia,
but also the customs and traditions of our nation.72
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NO. 27-90, at 2 (1990).
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As this explanation indicates, the second sentence added nothing new; it
merely emphasizes the point of the first sentence.
A second successful amendment removed legislative power over
“major crimes” from the national government and gave it to the states,
leaving national power only over crimes of a “national” nature.73 The effect
of this amendment was to divest national courts of jurisdiction over these
criminal cases. Under the previous system, the national government would
handle all crimes subject to punishment for three or more years (later
increased to five years, then ten years), including serious crimes like rape
and murder.74 That is why the prosecutions of Tammed and Tamangrow for
sexual assault were handled in the national court system. Following the
amendment, state prosecutors and courts have exclusive control over crimes
of this sort.
Taking stock of developments thus far, a few conclusions can be
drawn with some confidence. Judges King and Benson have departed, and
Judge Amaraich recently died. There are currently two sitting national
judges, Judge Martin Yinug, a Yapese with an American law degree, and
Judge Dennis Yamase, an expatriate American lawyer who has lived and
worked in Micronesia for decades. As would be expected after three
decades of independence, a substantial body of law has developed. Judicial
opinions today are filled with citations to Micronesian cases. Although U.S.
cases are cited far less frequently than in the past, behind many of the
Micronesian cases lie U.S. precedents, and many of the legal rules and
doctrines are derived from the United States.
In this respect, Judge King was extremely effective, and his enduring
legacy will not likely be erased. Common law systems tend not to
reexamine precedents. Nor is it necessarily desirable that the developed
body of rules should be reexamined in a wholesale manner. Legal officials
in Micronesia have become accustomed to their jurisprudence and the
system operates well. Many of the technical legal doctrines the court
adopted, for example rules like abstention and standing, have no
implications for Micronesian traditional culture, but are essential to every
judicial system and must be worked out. The critical tone of this article
should not diminish the genuine achievement of the first generation of
judges on the Micronesian Supreme Court.
The struggle between law and society addressed in this article will
undoubtedly continue in ways that are impossible to anticipate. Certain
constitutional provisions, especially in the Bill of Rights, and certain aspects
73
74

See FSM CONST. art. IX, § 2(p) (amended 1991).
The changes are explained in King, supra note 36, at 271 n.70.
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of the legal system—including its adversarial style, with winners and
losers—are in tension with Micronesian norms. Owing to this structural
feature of their society-law relationship there is an ever-present potentiality
for conflict.

